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RETROACTIVE TRIALS AND JUSTICE
Stephan Landsman*

RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL. By Carlos Santiago Nino. New Haven:
Yale University Press. 1996. Pp. xii, 220. $27.50.
Human beings suffer,

History says, Don't hope

Call miracle self-healing:

They torture one another,

On this side of the grave.

The utter, self-revealing

They get hurt and get hard.

But then, once in a lifetime

Double-take of feeling.

No poem or play or song
Can fully right a wrong
Inflicted and endured.

The longed-for tidal wave
Of justice can rise up,
And hope and history rhyme.

If there's fire on the mountain

The innocent in gaols
Beat on their bars together.

So hope for a great sea-change That means someone is hearing
On the far side of revenge.
The outcry and the birth·cry
1
Of new life at its term.
Believe that a further shore

A hunger-striker's father
Stands in the graveyard dumb.
The police widow in veils
Faints at the funeral home.

Or lightning and storm
And a god speaks from the sky

Is reachable from here.
Believe in miracles
And cures and healing wells.

Seamus Heaney's moving words remind us that we live in an
extraordinary time when, at sites of grave injustice ranging from the
halls of government of Argentina and South Africa to the killing
fields of Bosnia and Rwanda, "The longed-for tidal wave/Of justice
can rise up,/And hope and history rhyme."
Writers have attempted, in very different ways, to come to terms
with the swelling of the tide of justice. For example, the philoso
pher Alan Rosenbaum, in a recent book about the prosecution of
Nazi war criminals,' ¥gues that virtually every person implicated in
the Nazis' genoCidal assault on Europe's Jews should be prosecuted
to the full extent of the law.2 His uncompromising position is "that
not bringing suspected Nazi criminals to trial is :flagrantly immoral
and a serious assault on the basic values of civilization and on the
conception of a democratic, rights-based society." 3 For
Rosenbaum, moral factors always trump "rebuttable considerations
like time and resource expenditures. "4
A.
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Rosenbaum's dismissal of the practical stands in striking con
trast to the approach taken by Carlos Santiago Nino's5 Radical Evil
on Trial. The late Professor Nino's work is, in essence, a painstak
ing assessment of the practicality of retroactive justice.6 Nino traces
the pragmatic pursuit of justice in Argentina and a number of other
nations as each struggled to replace an oppressive regime with a
popularly chosen successor. In doing so, he provides insight into
the nature and likely prospects of contemporary efforts to secure
justice around the world.
I.

THE STORY OF ARGENTINA

Carlos Nino was deeply involved in Argentina's transformation,
in the middle 1980s, from a military dictatorship to a democracy.
He was a personal adviser to President Raill Alfonsfn, who oversaw
the country's transition. Because of Nino's personal involvement
with events and personal relations with some of the actors, passages
of his book read more like a memoir than a scholarly assessment.
But Nino succeeds in making his retelling of Argentina's story more
than the reminiscences of a witness to history. In his hands, Argen
tina's recent struggles become a didactic experience from which
powerful lessons may be derived about the practical prospects for
retroactive justice.
In March 1976, the military launched a coup to oust Isabel
Peron from the Argentine presidency. Once in power the military
junta curtailed civil liberties, dissolved Congress, and replaced in
dependent judges, government officials, and university personnel
with ideologically vetted substitutes. Harsh antisubversive legisla
tion was adopted, and a reign of terror was initiated. Alleged sub
versives and other opponents of the regime were abducted,
tortured, and killed - all without the slightest justification or ex
planation. Many of those who disappeared were never heard from
again, and those who were released eventually told of the most bru
tal mistreatment. Jewish detainees were frequently the target of
anti-Semitic atrocities. Eventually, the military clairiied that these
grievous human rights abuses were justified by the exigencies of
Argentina's "dirty war" against terrorism (p. 56). Even the mili
tary, however, conceded that the targets of its torture and murder
campaign were seldom terrorists but rather "individuals considered
5. Professor Nino "held a chair in philosophy of law at the University of Buenos Aires
and, starting in 1986, was a regular visiting professor at the Yale Law School." P. 207. He
died suddenly and tragically in 1993 while the manuscript of this volume was still unfinished.
Fmal preparation of the book was overseen by Professor Owen FISs.
6. By "retroactive justice," Nino means legal proceedings that were not begun, or even
possible, at the time the crimes were committed but have been made feasible by the fall of a
repressive regime and its replacement by a democratic successor. P. viii.
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threatening to the consolidation of the military's political, social,
and economic power" (p. 58).
As time passed, Argentine resistance to the military's abuses
grew. A number of human rights groups spearheaded this resist
ance, including Servicio de Paz y Justicia, whose leader, Adolfo
Perez Esquivel, received the Nobel Peace Prize after two years of
detention (p. 59). Weekly demonstrations by the Madres de Plaza
de Mayo underscored, for the world, the fact that thousands had
disappeared. From about 1979 on, outside pressure, most particu
larly from the United States, began to focus substantial attention on
military abuses and generate calls for redress and reform (p. 60).
By 1980, the military's grip on Argentina was beginning to slip,
due in part to internal and international pressure, but also reflecting
the impact of a substantial economic downturn (p. 60). In Decem
ber 1981, the military replaced its junta leader, General Eduardo
Viola, with General Leopoldo Galtieri. The military's position con
tinued to deteriorate, and massive antigovernment demonstrations
took place in the early days of 1982. In what seemed a desperate
bid for public support, the military launched an invasion of the
Falkland Islands, a small chain of British-controlled islands off the
Argentine Coast. The British responded to this military adventure
by sending an armada to retake the Islands. The Argentine army
was overwhelmed and surrendered on June 14, 1982. This military
disgrace led to Galtieri's fall and further eroded the military gov
ernment's standing (p. 61).
By 1983, it had become clear that civilian replacement of the
military regime was only a matter of time. The military attempted
to insulate its members from liability by declaring that all acts un
dertaken during the dirty war were committed pursuant to "supe
rior commands" (p. 62) and were, therefore, perfectly lawful as
"due obedience" (p. 64). Civilian leaders unanimously rejected this
claim, and the Radical Party's candidate, Alfonsfn, promised that, if
elected, his government would put on trial those who were respon
sible for gross abuses of human rights. Faced with an enormous
pool of potential defendants, Alfonsfn labored to identify those
who should be targeted for prosecution. He chose to focus on the
planners of repression and those who acted beyond the scope of
orders, rather than those who had simply abducted and tortured in
the regime's name. He made this distinction because he was con
vinced that otherwise there would be far too many defendants. In
Alfonsfn's view, this likely would provoke the military into armed
resistance. In September 1983, the military promulgated a "self am
nesty" law (p. 64). Alfonsfn rejected this gambit out of hand, while
the other leading candidate, Peronist Italo Luder, seemed to equiv
ocate about its legitimacy. Many in Argentina - including, per-
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haps, the military - believed that the Peronists, who had never lost
an open election, would take control of the government, thereby
foreclosing the prospect of prosecution. Alfonsfn, however, sur
prised the pundits by garnering fifty-two percent of the vote aided, it would appear, by his strong stand regarding prosecutions.
Once in office, Alfonsfn set his government about the task of
discovering the fate of all those who had disappeared. He also
sought to determine who ought to be tried for human rights abuses.
His three fundamental principles were:
1. Both state and subversive terrorism should be punished.
2. There must be limits on those held responsible, for it would be
impossible effectively to pursue all those who had committed crimes.
3. The trials should be limited to a finite period during which public
enthusiasm for such a program remained high. [p. 67]

Alfonsfn seemed to be searching for a realistic prosecutorial agenda
that would appear evenhanded - hence the focus on subversives as
well as the state - and would balance the demands of justice with
the realities of limited judicial resources, the military's violent op
position to widespread punishment, and a predictable decline in
public enthusiasm if trials dragged on for too long. While struggling
to fix this agenda, Alfonsfn also set about reforming the judiciary by
removing those judges compromised by adherence to the dubious
legal initiatives of the military regime (p. 72).
Political and judicial realities led Alfonsfn to curtail the reach
and focus of his campaign for retroactive prosecution even further.
As a means of garnering military cooperation and re-establishing
the armed forces' credibility, Alfonsfn arranged to give military
tribunals the first opportunity to consider charges against military
defendants. These courts had the power to narrow the reach of
prosecution substantially. According to Nino, Alfonsfn was more
concerned with the future than the past - with establishing the
rule of law and deterring future violations of human rights. He con
ceived this as a necessary orientation in a still-divided Argentina
facing an ongoing threat of military insurrection. Alfonsfn did not
want to bury the past, but he was not wedded to seeking criminal
convictions of all those involved in past wrongdoing. As Nino sum
marizes, "While the pursuit of truth would be unrestricted, the pun
ishment would be limited, based on deterrent rather than
retributive considerations and on the need to incorporate every sec
tor in the democratic process" (p. 68). This formula reflects the
Argentine effort to forge a compromise that would punish grave
misdeeds but leave society intact. This approach outraged human
rights organizations, which bitterly attacked the government. Their
protests had the ironic effect of drawing them into a bizarre alliance
with the military, which also vigorously challenged Alfonsfn's
approach.
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Recognizing that a limited number of prosecutions could not de
liver a full accounting, Alfonsfn determined to serve the cause of
truth - or full disclosure - by creating what, in recent days, has
come to be known as a truth commission.7 The task of this execu
tive branch commission, referred to as CONADEP (the acronym of
its Spanish title), was to review fully the questions of dirty-war-era
torture and abduction. Its report was to be made within 180 days.
It was authorized to hear complaints from victims, receive volun
tary testimony, and demand written statements from public officials
(p. 72). Human rights organizations initially refused to contribute
representatives to CONADEP, and the military viewed it with open
hostility. Yet the commission moved forward briskly. Complaints
poured in, and CONADEP examined thousands of charges. It also
inspected 340 clandestine detention centers and struggled tirelessly
to secure the identification of the remains of murder victims (p. 79).
Eventually, rights organizations began to cooperate, as they ob
served the seriousness and scope of CONADEP's work. At the end
of its allotted time, CONADEP issued a massive report detailing
the workings of the military government's torture and disappear
ance machinery. This report, entitled Nunca Mas (Never Again),
was a powerful indictment of the old regime. CONADEP also
presented the courts with 1086 cases for judicial review (p. 80).
While things moved forward rapidly for CONADEP, the mili
tary tribunals stalled. Their delays in considering the cases referred
to them and their hostility to retroactive justice eventually led to
the removal of the atrocity charges from military jurisdiction. In
the meantime, armed forces unrest grew and threats of revolt
multiplied.
Alfonsfn renewed his efforts to narrow the ambit of prosecution.
The civilian courts, however, would not cooperate. 1)iey asserted
jurisdiction over a broad range of the crimes that the prior regime
had committed. In April 1985, while disputes raged about a
number of other cases, the "big trial" (p. 82) of the leaders of the
military junta began. This proceeding was fraught with symbolism
as the new judiciary sat in judgment of the leaders of the once all
powerful armed forces. When, at the start of the proceedings,
counsel for one of the defendants behaved disrespectfully, his disci
plinary arrest was immediately ordered. The message concerning
the shift in power could not have been clearer.
The judges presiding at the big trial heard an extraordinary ar
ray of witnesses - 832 in all. These included military and civilian
7. See generally Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Com
parative Study, 16 HuM. RTS. Q. 597 (1994); Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to
Serious Human Rights Abuses: OfProsecution and Truth Commissions, LAW & CoNTEMP.
PRoBs., Autumn 1996, at 81.
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leaders, as well as torture victims, forensic scientists - who had
examined the remains of victims - and a host of others (p. 84).
One troubling aspect of the trial was its seeming disregard of most
evidentiary restrictions - especially those concerning relevance
and hearsay. The absence of evidentiary constraints meant that
there was virtually no way to keep the case focused on the defend
ants in the dock. Instead, the court was inundated with questiona
ble evidence touching on all aspects of the military's dirty war.
Hearsay was in constant use. The court was provided with lengthy
secondhand recitations about the work of a number of investigative
bodies, including the United Nations Human Rights Commission,
CONADEP, and even the U.S. Department of State. In addition,
the court heard a great deal of even more troubling hearsay, like
the testimony of French Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti who
recounted a meeting with Gen. Jose Montes [not a defendant at the
trial] , a foreign minister of the military government, during which he
had inquired about the French nuns who had disappeared; Montes
replied that it was strange to evince concern about those nuns when a
manager of the Peugeot factory had been assassinated by the guerril
las. [p. 83]

This testimony intimated the callousness of all members of the mili
tary leadership and associated the defendants - whether fairly or
not - with the disappearance and murder of a group of innocent
nuns. In the end, a powerful case was made against the defendants,
but a great deal of extraneous material was injected into the lengthy
proceedings. The army reacted violently to the case. The trial was
branded - not altogether unjustly - a "political show" (p. 84), and
increasingly strident threats were voiced against Alfonsfn's govern
ment. The defendants and their counsel complained that
CONADEP had framed a case to convict them unjustly - a charge
that was hard to refute because of the court's reliance on a sum
mary of CONADEP's work rather than on firsthand · evidence.
Outside the courtroom, a series of bombings took place and ten
sions grew.
Concerned because of military unrest, in October 1985, Alfonsfn
arranged an ex parte meeting with the judges presiding over the big
trial. At that meeting the President pressed the judges to embrace
publicly the principle of due obedience and thereby excuse those
below the rank of military leader from retroactive liability (pp. 8687). The judges rejected this proposal, and in December 1985,
found five of the nine big-trial defendants guilty of a host of crimi
nal charges. In March 1986, Alfonsfn again met secretly with the
judges to urge them to accept the due obedience idea (p. 90).
When this gambit failed, the President began to explore other
means of cutting off retroactive prosecution. One of these was a
proposed executive instruction to military prosecutors that pending
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cases against military leaders be concluded speedily and that cases
against subordinates be halted immediately with acquittals. This
proposal provoked the resignation of Judge Jorge Torlasco of the
federal court of appeals and a chorus of protests from human rights
organizations (p. 91 ). It was withdrawn, but not before it had the
boomerang effect of stiffening judicial opposition to compromise.
All during this period, military resistance and violence escalated,
eventually calling into question the survival of the government.
Faced with what he perceived to be irreconcilable pressures
threatening to tear Argentina apart, Alfonsfn proposed and secured
the passage of a " 'full stop' law (punto final) " (p. 92) that imposed
a sixty-day cutoff date on the filing of retroactive charges. This law
was enacted in December 1986, despite substantial popular opposi
tion. It too boomeranged, resulting in the hasty filing of hundreds
of new criminal charges to beat the legislatively imposed filing
deadline. During Easter week in 1987, the simmering military un
rest came to a boil. Military officers in a number of localities voiced
open defiance of the government. Despite Alfonsfn's courageous
handling of the immediate crisis - he went unarmed to a rebel
base and talked its commander into surrendering - conditions con
tinued to deteriorate (pp. 98-99). The political difficulties of the
government were compounded by a sharp economic decline.
Alfonsfn struggled desperately to rein in the prosecutions. To this
end, in June 1987, he convinced the Congress to adopt a due obedi
ence law that protected virtually all soldiers below the rank of com
mander. As a matter of political strategy, this solution came too
late. In September 1987, Alfonsfn was voted out of office and re
placed by Peronist Carlos Menem. With hyperinflation running
rampant, Menem was invited to assume the presidency early. He
did so and almost immediately issued pardons that freed many of
the military leaders most responsible for the dirty war (p. 103). The
following year Menem also pardoned the junta leaders convicted in
the big trial.
The lessons to be drawn from the Argentine experience are
many, some of them encouraging, but others sobering in the ex
treme. Democracy did triumph by sweeping away a repressive mili
tary regime. At the heart of that triumph was the will of the
Argentine people to elect a president - Alfonsfn - who promised
to prosecute those who had grossly violated human rights. Democ
racy's victory was enhanced by the work of courageous political
leaders, judges, and prosecutors who pressed cases against torturers
and murderers despite profound risks. Perhaps as significant was
the vindication of the principle of full public disclosure of the truth
about the crimes of the past. By means of a truth commission CONADEP - Argentineans explored and then publicized all that
had happened during the dirty war. CONADEP was an unalloyed
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success. It worked speedily, uncovered the true history of a tragic
time, and made that history public. It did so without provoking a
violent military response. In a dangerously riven society,
CONADEP began the process of healing through full disclosure.
Its success, and the success of other truth commissions in countries
like Chile,8 has not gone unremarked. In South Africa, Nelson
Mandela's government turned to a truth commission to expose and
explore the crimes of the apartheid era.9 This choice speaks
volumes about the perceived power of truth as a tool for social
reconstruction.
The story is much less encouraging when the efficacy of criminal
prosecutions is considered. The criminal process worked too slowly
and too elaborately. It raised hopes that it could not satisfy and
fears that it allowed to fester. Argentina's big trial was a real vic
tory for the rule of law. But it came at enormous cost. The concept
of unbridled prosecution eventually became a stumbling block. The
832-witness proceeding swept virtually every sort of charge and
every imaginable kind of proof into the public arena. For the mili
tary, this meant that every soldier had become a potential target for
prosecution. For the victims, this seemed to signal an opportunity
not just for social justice but for personal vindication. For human
rights organizations, this appeared to be the beginning of a process
to review every wrong done by the armed forces.
Argentina simply could not afford such a broad-ranging process.
It had neither the judicial resources nor the political will. Although
Alfonsfn recognized this, he could never effectively channel the
proceedings. Moreover, the big trial invited both friend and foe
alike to assume that personalized criminal proceedings would be
come the norm. Alfonsfn tried, through the full stop and due obe
dience laws, to impose prudential limits. In each case, his effort was
seen as too little, too late. In both instances, the government's
strategy boomeranged: first fueling a hectic rush to get cases filed,
and then a cynicism that paved the way for mass pardons. The gov
ernment's dilemma led it to dubious ex parte negotiations with the
judiciary and indecisiveness that alienated friends and encouraged
foes. The trial mechanism and retroactive prosecution are critically
valuable tools in reasserting the power of the law, but they are no
panacea. Such tools must be used thoughtfully so as not to exhaust
the political and social resources of a fledgling democracy. This is
not an invitation to abandon trials, but rather a call for their judi8. Nino discusses the work of the Chilean Commission of Truth and Reconciliation. Pp.
37-38; see also Jose Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The
Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
1425, 1434 (1992).
9. See generally Tma Rosenberg, Recovering from Apartheid, THE NEW YORKER, Nov.
18, 1996, at 86.
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cious use in the service of the broader aim of establishing a decent
and durable society.
II. A

TAXONOMY OF ISSUES AFFECTING THE FEASIBILITY OF
RETROACTIVE TRIALS

Nino does not rely exclusively on the Argentine experience in
attempting to assess the practical prospects of mounting retroactive
trials to punish those responsible for massive human rights viola
tions. Rather, he reviews events in more than a score of countries,
ranging from post-1945 Germany to 1980s Chile. He concludes that
while every nation's situation is unique, there are certain positive
factors that facilitate trials as well as certain negative ones that pull
in the opposite direction. He lists the following as positive factors:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

coercive nature of the process of transition
legal discontinuities
heinousness of the abuses
absolute and relative quantity of the abuses
social identification with the victims of the abuses
sharpness of the trials
leadership [p. 126]

Nino argues that the virtually ideal setting for retroactive justice
was post-World War II Germany. By force of arms, the victorious
allies had smashed the Nazi regime completely. The Germans had
no means of mounting effective opposition to trials. All the Nazi
era laws and rules that might have been used to justify barbarous
and criminal conduct had been swept away. Indeed, the Nazis'
overarching racist dogma had been dealt a death blow. The hei
nous and vast nature of the Holocaust was becoming apparent to all
those willing to make inquiry. Although the German people did
not embrace Jewish and other victims, the victims were an object of
genuine
if belated - humanitarian concern amongst those who
prosecuted. The trials, while far from sharply focused, did not be
come absolutely unwieldy. The first prosecution concentrated, at
least nominally, on twenty-four named individuals and moved at a
pace that yielded a decision within ten months.10 Successive trials
moved more swiftly still. Towering leaders, particularly the Nurem
berg chief prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson,
drove the process toward a decisive and morally justified goal. Yet,
despite all this, the prosecutorial process ran out of energy long
before all those involved in awful criminal acts had been identified
or prosecuted. Even the so-called de-Nazification program faltered
-

10. For a detailed description of the Nuremberg proceedings see TELFORD TAYLOR, THE
ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (1992).
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as the political realities of the Cold War made prosecution less at
tractive and German reconstruction more important.11
Few cases will have as many positive factors as Nuremberg. In
deed, many prosecutions will be inhibited by a range of problems.
Nino identifies a series of such negative factors, including:

consensual nature of the transition
time span between deeds and trials
•
social identification with perpetrators of abuses
•
diffusion of responsibility
•
cohesion of the perpetrators [p. 127]
If Germany was a virtually ideal setting for retroactive justice,

•
•

Spain in the 1970s was its antithesis. Throughout that decade, Spain
moved at an accelerating pace toward democracy. The death of the
Spanish dictator Francisco Franco in 1975 opened the way for full
scale reform. Rather than prosecute Franco-era officials for the
suffering they inflicted on Spaniards from 1 939 onward, Spanish
legislators, in October 1977, "enacted a general amnes_ty of all polit
ically motivated crimes" (p. 17). The next year a constitution was
adopted that firmly closed the door on retroactive justice. Nino
suggests that the consensual nature of the Spanish transition - ac
complished without force and through incremental steps toward de
mocracy - undermined social support for trials (p. 17). Moreover,
the most serious human rights violations committed by Franco's
government had occurred during and shortly after the civil war,
which ended in 1939. There was, over time, a blurring of memory
as well as an amelioration of divisions between pro- and anti
Franco citizens. Many had lived, worked, and even prospered
under the slowly reforming Spanish dictatorship. In the end, there
was, according to Nino, a strong social consensus to "let bygones be
bygones" (p. 17).
Most shifts from oppressive regimes to democracy fall some
where between these two extremes. In each case, Nino argues,
there will be factors pushing toward and away from criminal prose
cution. Nino's taxonomy suggests that large numbers of prosecu
tions will seldom be either feasible or popular. The key goal of
most states following the fall of an oppressive regime is not trials,
but the establishment of a durable democracy. Retroactive prose
cution may be an important step in that process, but it is not an end
in itself. It must be harmonized with an array of other concerns.
While the absolute shattering of the old regime may open the way
for broad-based legal proceedings, even here practical limits on the
scope and duration of trials will eventually be reached. Increas
ingly, therefore, truth-commission inquiry has been substituted for
11. See CAROLYN WoooY EISENBERG, DRAWING THE
TO DIVIDE GERMANY, 1944-1949, at 372-74 (1996).

LINE: THE AMERICAN DECISION
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retroactive prosecutions. The goal has not necessarily been to pun
ish past criminal conduct, but rather to publicize it. In such in
stances, knowledge, rather than retribution, has been judged to be
the fundamental building block of the future.
III.

LESSONS ABOUT RETROACTIVE TRIALS THEMSELVES

Despite significant impediments, the world, over the past half
century, has had significant experience with retroactive prosecu
tion. Although it appears that the Nuremberg experience has cre
ated an enduring expectation that grave human rights abuses will be
tried elaborately, the Argentine experience suggests that such trials
are not without pitfalls. Nino remarks:
[E]ven when the perpetrators of human rights violations are prose
cuted, widespread criticism typically surfaces. Some people are disap
pointed at the contrast between the expectations of justice and the
limited results of the strenuous proceedings. Others feel guilty about
the omissions, recognizing that the ensuing power relations were re
sponsible for the trials' shape. Still others feel great hypocrisy when
those integrally involved in the abusive regime escape punishment,
even retaining important public positions, or when those who were
silent in the past suddenly become vociferous advocates of retroactive
justice. Some grieve for victims of human rights abuses who were not
sufficiently compensated, rehabilitated, or acknowledged. Others feel
resentful when the victorious foreigners form tribunals that are bi
ased, or when those foreigners press for rigid standards of justice
which their own societies do not follow and which ignore the difficul
ties of nascent democracy. Still others realize that the popular impact
of the trials is rather superficial and fleeting. [pp. 39-40]

Nino's initial observation in this passage underscores the prob
lem of selectivity that the decision to prosecute poses. It is inevita
ble that a far smaller number will be prosecuted than are actually
responsible. The difficulties of gathering proof and mounting trials
necessitate narrowing the field of potential defendants. Often, as at
the first Nuremberg trial, the defendants are chosen so as to serve a
symbolic as well as an individual role in the criminal proceedings;
they are tried not only for their own deeds but as proxies for all
those who acted similarly. This means that others who may be
equally guilty will not be tried. Such an arrangement is obviously
open to criticism, but difficult to avoid so long as there are inade
quate means to prosecute everyone.
The symbolic overtones of many prosecutorial decisions in ret
roactive justice cases carry other serious implications for the trials
that are mounted. First, a mixed prosecutorial agenda - pursuing
both actual and symbolic guilt - will often result in greater reli
ance on evidence regarding the character of the defendant than
otherwise might be the case. Nino explains that this perhaps sur-
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prising phenomenon arises out of a desire for retribution, height
ened by the representative nature of the defendant and amplified
by the felt need to redress all the wrongs perpetrated. As Nino sees
it, retribution is only legitimate if deserved by the offender. "[T]he
desert of the offender is gauged by his character - i.e., the kind of
person he is" (p. 140). Hence, character evidence becomes a critical
part of the proof despite many evidentiary systems' strong reserva
tions about such material because of its prejudicial impact.12 In
deed, concerns about prejudice are most powerful when the crime
charged is vast and the defendant is viewed as a representative of a
group of malefactors.
A second result of a mixed-agenda prosecution is that when op
portunities to bear witness are limited - because of a paucity of
trials - and when the proofs presented are designed to serve sym
bolic as well as defendant-specific purposes, traditional notions of
relevance likely will be stretched. Those with particularly poignant
stories will be allowed to testify even though what they have to say
has little direct bearing on the charges. It may be impossible for
humane prosecutors to deny incredibly deserving victims an oppor
tunity to confront their oppressors and address the world regarding
their suffering. Moreover, the prosecutors often will either face a
surfeit of proof or conceive their role as requiring an expansive
presentation. In either case, they will find it exceedingly difficult to
winnow their evidence.13
·

A related evidentiary consequence of the mixed-objective pros
ecution is heightened use of hearsay materials. While many judicial
systems impose no bar on hearsay, most view it as an inferior and
often troubling form of proof.14 Yet it is likely to be particularly
heavily relied upon in retroactive justice proceedings. Because ex
panded notions of relevance make the words and deeds of many
more actors germane at trial, past writings and summaries of previ
ous inquiries are necessary to allow the introduction of more proof
without an endless queue of witnesses. Further, as events of impor
tance to the trial slip further and further into the past, the dulling of
12. The American position is succinctly set forth in FED. R. Evro. 404(a): "Evidence of a
person's character or a trait of character is not [generally] admissible for the purpose of
proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion . . . ."
13. Such forces seem to have been at work in Argentina's big trial, in which an astound
ing 832 witnesses were called. Many told harrowing stories of torture and loss that were only
tangentially related to the defendants in the dock. Even Nino's brief description of the trial
makes it abundantly clear that relevance was viewed in the most elastic terms despite the
impact of such an approach on the length and sharpness of focus of the trial.
14. See 30 CHARI.Es ALAN WruGHr & KENNE1H W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 6324 (1997) (discussing, at length, the nature of "the hearsay dangers").
On the European recognition of the dangers associated with hearsay, see MIR.JAN R.
DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 15-16 (1997) (discussing European awareness of and cau
tion in using hearsay materials).
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memory and effects of natural attrition make it ever more likely
that hearsay will be needed as a substitute for living recollection.15
Experience suggests trials are likely to be more effective if they
are speedy and sharply focused. While the big trial had substantial
value to Argentina, its length and lack of focus afforded the military
an opportunity to mount increasingly effective resistance. Nino
concludes that "[l]ong proceedings tend to undermine the success
of trials, since public support, so vital for the success of the enter
prise, may fade with the passing of time, as happened in Argentina
after 1986" (pp. 124-25). He is similarly critical of "unwieldy" pro
ceedings (p. 125). The tendency toward symbolism, lengthy witness
lists, marginal evidentiary presentations, and hearsay all interfere
with expeditious and narrowly focused proceedings, thereby jeop
ardizing the very cause they seek to vindicate.
IV.

RETROACTIVE TRIALS IN OTHER CONTEXTS

Nino's taxonomy presumes the recent replacement of an op
pressive regime by a democratic successor. As Nino recognizes, this
is not the only context in which retroactive trials may arise. They
may occur when a particularly odious malefactor is seized long after
the conclusion of his criminal career, as was the case with Adolf
Eichmann. Alternatively, trials may be mounted at the behest of
the outraged world community in response to massive human rights
violations, as in the cases of both Bosnia16 and Rwanda.17 In these
cases, the dynamics of prosecution may differ somewhat from those
outlined above.
A number of the positive and negative factors Nino identifies as
affecting prosecution will not apply with nearly the same force in a
setting like the Eichmann trial or a United Nations Tribunal pro
ceeding. In such cases, no transition to democracy colors proceed
ings or generates pressure for celerity. The applicable law, rather
than serving as a barrier to prosecution, is likely specifically to al
low the court to prosecute the alleged acts, as was the situation in
the Eichmann trial,18 or may have even been enacted to found the
tribunal.19 In neither case is a past legal regime likely to create
impediments to prosecution. Political constituencies or populations
sympathetic to the defendant are far less likely to have any signifi15. For example, Argentina's big trial relied on vast quantities of hearsay from agencies
like the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and CONADEP as well as a number
of individuals. Pp. 83-84.
16. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827
(1993) (approving the Yugoslavia Tribunal).
17. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955
(1994) (approving the Rwanda Tribunal).
18. See The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 1950, S.H. 57.
19. See supra notes 16-17.
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cant impact on the society or international body mounting the case.
Yet a number of the forces identified by Nino are still likely to be at
work and to influence proceedings. In the Eichmann case, for ex
ample, awareness of the grievousness of the Holocaust had grown
with time, and this played a major role in dictating the course of the
prosecution. Similarly, there would never have been an Eichmann
trial were it not for the intense identification of the prosecuting
state with the victims of Nazi genocide.
The factors of growing awareness of the crime and identification
with its victims heightened the symbolic importance of the
Eichmann trial for Israelis.20 Based on Nino's analysis, this would
lead one to predict that Israel would mount a sprawling trial, seek
to tell the story of the entire Holocaust, disregard evidentiary re
strictions, and focus a great deal of attention on Eichmann's charac
ter. The Eichmann proceedings bear out these predictions. The
Holocaust story and Eichmann's character became central focuses
of the case.21 The prosecution called 121 witnesses who described
in detail the entirety of Nazi genocide - whether it had anything to
do with Eichmann or not.22 The government also introduced a
mountain of documents, including the forty-two-volume record of
the Nuremberg proceedings, the 3500 pages of the defendant's pre
trial interrogation, and more than a half-dozen books.23 The docu
mentary material was laced with all sorts of hearsay, and the
witnesses stretched notions of relevance to the breaking point.24
Perhaps the best example of the court's attitude toward character
evidence was its admission of a 1946 statement by Dieter Wisliceny,
who, at the moment of his statement, was trying unsuccessfully to
barter information for his life:
I considered Eichmann's character and personality important fac
tors in carrying out measures against the Jews. He was personally a
cowardly man who went to great pains to protect himself from re
sponsibility. He never made a move without approval from higher
authority and was extremely careful to keep files and records estab
lishing the responsibility of Himmler, Heydrich and later
Kaltenbrunner. . . .

20. See ToM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH Mn.LION:
86 (Haim Watzman trans., 1993).
21. Id.

THE ISRAELIS

AND

THE HOLOCAUST 323-

at 350-54.

22. Id.
23. 9 TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN REcoRD OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT CoURT
OF JERUSALEM (Trust for the Publication of the Proceedings of the Eichmann Trial in cooper
ation with the Israel State Archives and Yad Vashem trans., 1992) [hereinafter TRIAL OF
ADoLF EICHMANN] (Vol. 9 provides a microfiche of all exhibits submitted at trial.).
24. See GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 322-408 (1966), for a detailed descrip
tion of the Eichmann proceedings. Hausner was the chief Israeli prosecutor in the Eichmann
case.
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Eichmann was very cynical in his attitude toward the Jewish Ques
tion. He gave no indication of any human feeling toward these peo
ple. He was not immoral, he was amoral and completely ice-cold in
his attitude. He said to me on the occasion of our last meeting in
February 1945, at which time we were discussing our fates upon losing
the War: 'I will laugh when I jump into the grave because of the feel
ing that I have killed 5,000,000 Jews. That gives me great satisfaction
and gratification.'25

Not only. were such character analyses regularly admitted, they
were zealously pursued by the court. At one point in the proceed
ings Judge Halevi - one of the members of the three-judge Jerusa
lem District Court trial panel - asked a key witness, Pastor
Heinrich Gruber:
Dr. Griiber, you said that as a man of religion, a clergyman, you are,
and always were, interested in the motivation of the people who were
involved, and therefore you took notice of the character of the Ac
cused, Eichmann. You said that you encountered the glacial manner
of a man who is like a block of ice or marble and with a deep hatred.
You said that, at first, you could not understand such a man at all that is until you experienced the concentration camp. Is this beha
viour not like the behaviour of Hitler and his henchmen which he
used as an example?26

Conviction and punishment had everything to do with being like
Hitler. Hence, character proofs of the sort Anglo-American-Israeli
evidence rules generally frown upon were energetically sought.
In the end, the problems of duration and focus so prominent in
Argentina's big trial also affected the Eichmann prosecution. The
trial lasted four months, and the decision took another four months.
The trend toward lengthy prosecutions was exacerbated later, when
Israel undertook its second Nazi war-crimes trial - that of John
Demjanjuk in 1987. That trial lasted more than a year, became pre
occupied with questions of the defendant's character, and foun
dered on misidentification.27 These Israeli trials, like the ones Nino
considers, have a great deal to teach us about the difficulties of ret
roactive prosecution. As the world moves forward with tribunals
for Bosnia and Rwanda and debates the structure of a permanent
international court,28 the lessons to be learned from past experience
are especially valuable and deserving of attention.
25.

1 TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN, supra note 23, at 201.

26. 2 TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN, supra note 23, at 750.
27. See ToM TEICHOLZ, THE TRIAL OF IvAN THE TERRIBLE (1990), for a detailed de
scription of the Demjanjuk trial.
28. See NoUVELLES ETUDES PENALES No. 13, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CoURT:
OBSERVATIONS AND ISSUES BEFORE THE 1997-98 PREPARATORY COMMITTEE; AND ADMINIS
TRATIVE AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1997).
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Having reviewed the practical difficulties, Nino eventually turns
his attention to the critical question of whether retroactive trials are
worth the risk. He begins his examination with a discussion of the
work of several scholars who have argued that prosecution is a mis
take in settings like Argentina's - and perhaps more generally.
Samuel Huntington suggests that when political costs significantly
outweigh moral gains, trials should be avoided altogether.29 Ac
cording to Huntington, even in the best of circumstances only the
very highest leaders of a repressive regime should be tried - and
these few only if the cases can be concluded in one year or less.30
Otherwise, the new government is courting political unrest and
eventual blanket pardons.31
Nino also considers the arguments of Bruce Ackerman, who, in
a volume entitled The Future of Liberal Revolution, 32 argues that
postrevolutionary democracies often possess substantial moral capi
tal but limited organizational resources. To get bogged down in a
series of difficult retroactive trials is to risk squandering what little
organizational resources exist, while frittering away moral capital.
Ackerman, therefore, argues:
It is simple to squander moral capital in an ineffective effort to right
past wrongs - creating martyrs and fostering political alienation,
rather than contributing to a genuine sense of vindication. Moral cap
ital is better spent in educating the population in the limits of the law.
There can be no hope of comprehensively correcting the wrongs done
over a generation or more. A few crude, bureaucratically feasible re
forms will do more justice, and prove less divisive, than a quixotic
quest after the mirage of corrective justice.33

Nino rejects these provocative assessments of the value of retro
active proceedings. He concedes that trials pose immense risks but
sees prosecutions - at least in limited numbers - as "great occa
sions for social deliberation and for collective examination of the
moral values underlying public institutions" (p. 131). His sense is
that they can provide constitutive moments fundamental to the con
struction of a democratic tradition. In this view, trials are less im
portant as a means of adjudicating individual guilt than as
declarations of social values and concerns. They teach about the
scope and nature of atrocities, showcase the rule of law, reduce the
29. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
231 (1991).

TWENTIETH CENTURY

30.
31.
32.
33.

See id.
See id.
BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION (1992).
Id. at 72-73.
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demand for private vengeance, and orchestrate public deliberations
about the benefits of democracy (pp. 146-47).
I find myself troubled by the extent of Nino's emphasis on the
symbolic value of trials. They are, and should be treated as, a vital
means of establishing the proposition that criminals can expect to
be called before the seat of justice. We may not, as a practical mat
ter, be able fully to achieve this end, but our goal ought to be to
signal such an intention. While the political symbolism of trials is
important, its value may be overstated. Using trials as political or
social symbols tends to expand them, to call forth more evidence,
more witnesses, more focus on character, and more hearsay. This
may amplify public discourse - at least momentarily - but it may
also set an untoward precedent. Such an approach intimates that
all human rights trials should be conducted this way and is likely to
produce slow, expensive, and overtly political proceedings. It
would seem to me to be better to encourage the development of
fairer, faster, simpler, more efficient trials. The thousands in
Rwandan jails need to be tried, but the paraphernalia of Nurem
berg is unlikely to be able to do the job. Societies, and even the
world at large, may need some modicum of symbolism, but we
should not lose sight of individualized justice and its essential tools,
including rules of evidence, respect for prudential limits based on
the concept of relevance, and a commitment to convict only the
right person for the right offense. We should be mindful that justice
is dispensed on a continuing basis and that our goal ought to be the
creation of a truly workable system that can achieve the rule of law
worldwide.
CONCLUSION

A great deal may be learned from Nino's work.34 First, reality
counts. In thinking about retroactive justice it is important to con
sider carefully the scope and focus of the prosecutions to be
mounted. Sprawling, unfocused cases that pursue goals other than
34. Unfortunately, it must be noted that Nino's book is seriously marred by editorial
failure to identify and correct glaring lapses in spelling, grammar. and printing. Perhaps the
lapses may be explained by Nino's untimely death during the editorial process. Still, there
seems little excuse for the Yale University Press's editors not catching the misspelling of the
word "planned" as "planed" (p. ix), for describing the vast number of Stalin's victims as
"unaccountable" rather than innumerable (p. 21), for using the word "then" instead of
"them" (p. 136), and for dropping what appears to be at least one whole line of text (p. 161).
This list of errors is far from exhaustive. It should be noted that there are also substantive
errors in the text. On page 83, for example, "Erik [sic] Stover" is described as "the director
of the American Science Association." In reality Eric Stover was Staff Officer for the Com
mittee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility of the American Association for the Ad
vancement of Science. See THE BREAKING OF BODIES AND MINDS: TORTURE, PSYCHIATRIC
ABusE, AND THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS at xiii (Eric Stover & Elena 0. Nightingale eds.,
1985). Surely the job can be done better. A book with so many important things to say
deserves better editing and proofreading.
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the conviction of a particular defendant for a specified crime are
likely to generate serious justice-system problems. If not ade
quately addressed, these problems may defeat the prosecutorial ef
fort. Second, alternatives to trials such as truth commissions may
sometimes serve the interests of society more effectively than trials.
Finally, if trials are to take place, they should be fast, simple, clearly
focused, and sensitive to questions about the quality of the evi
dence. All these points need to be kept in mind as the world inches
toward the monumental step of fashioning an international criminal
court.

